Ownership and Trade from Evolutionary Games

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dc.creatorYee, Kenton K.
dc.date2002-10-30
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T06:36:19Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T06:36:19Z
dc.descriptionOwnership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. In these evolutionary game models, ownership status provides an endogenous asymmetrizing criterion enabling cheaper resolution of property conflicts.
dc.descriptionSee http://www.columbia.edu/~kky2001/ for related articles on author's personal web page
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210125
dc.identifierInternational Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 183-197, 2003
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/100043
dc.subjectBiological Physics
dc.subjectComputer Science and Game Theory
dc.subjectAdaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
dc.subjectCellular Automata and Lattice Gases
dc.subjectPhysics and Society
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleOwnership and Trade from Evolutionary Games
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