Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game

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We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.
4 Pages; 5 Figures; PRL format; for additional info, and a Seceder applet, see http://urania.barnard.edu/~mass/index.html

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Statistical Mechanics

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http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/21419

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0305356
 http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0305356

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arXiv