Population Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game

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dc.creatorSoulier, Arne
dc.creatorHalpin-Healy, Tim
dc.date2003-05-15
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T02:51:21Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T02:51:21Z
dc.descriptionWe examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and dissent. Our understanding of the spatiotemporally complex population dynamics is informed by a system of nonlinear replicator equations, discrete deterministic cousin of the original stochastic Seceder Model.
dc.description4 Pages; 5 Figures; PRL format; for additional info, and a Seceder applet, see http://urania.barnard.edu/~mass/index.html
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0305356
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0305356
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/21419
dc.subjectStatistical Mechanics
dc.titlePopulation Fragmentation and Party Dynamics in an Evolutionary Political Game
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