Why anthropic reasoning cannot predict Lambda
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We revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value of the cosmological constant. We argue that different ways of assigning probabilities to candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an extremely small probability for observing a value of Lambda equal to or greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic reasoning within the framework of probability as frequency is ill-defined and that in the absence of a fundamental motivation for selecting one weighting scheme over another the anthropic principle cannot be used to explain the value of Lambda, nor, likely, any other physical parameters.
4 pages, 1 figure. Discussion slighlty expanded, refs added, conclusions unchanged. Matches published version
4 pages, 1 figure. Discussion slighlty expanded, refs added, conclusions unchanged. Matches published version