Why anthropic reasoning cannot predict Lambda

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dc.creatorStarkman, Glenn D.
dc.creatorTrotta, Roberto
dc.date2006-07-11
dc.date2006-11-19
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T08:19:27Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T08:19:27Z
dc.descriptionWe revisit anthropic arguments purporting to explain the measured value of the cosmological constant. We argue that different ways of assigning probabilities to candidate universes lead to totally different anthropic predictions. As an explicit example, we show that weighting different universes by the total number of possible observations leads to an extremely small probability for observing a value of Lambda equal to or greater than what we now measure. We conclude that anthropic reasoning within the framework of probability as frequency is ill-defined and that in the absence of a fundamental motivation for selecting one weighting scheme over another the anthropic principle cannot be used to explain the value of Lambda, nor, likely, any other physical parameters.
dc.description4 pages, 1 figure. Discussion slighlty expanded, refs added, conclusions unchanged. Matches published version
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227
dc.identifierPhys.Rev.Lett. 97 (2006) 201301
dc.identifierdoi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.201301
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/134768
dc.subjectAstrophysics
dc.subjectHigh Energy Physics - Theory
dc.titleWhy anthropic reasoning cannot predict Lambda
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