Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

Thumbnail Image

Date

Authors

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Abstract

Description

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.
21 pages, to appear in Int. J. Game Theory

Keywords

Populations and Evolution

Citation

URI

http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/88436

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409028
 http://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409028

Collections

arXiv