Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

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dc.creatorBukowski, Maciej
dc.creatorMiekisz, Jacek
dc.date2004-09-24
dc.date.accessioned2026-07-07T05:58:39Z
dc.date.available2026-07-07T05:58:39Z
dc.descriptionWe provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.
dc.description21 pages, to appear in Int. J. Game Theory
dc.identifierhttps://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409028
dc.identifierhttp://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0409028
dc.identifier.urihttp://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/88436
dc.subjectPopulations and Evolution
dc.titleEvolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games
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