A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation

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We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
21 pages. To appear in International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

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Computer Science and Game Theory

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http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/221832

Consulte el texto completo en el siguiente enlace:

https://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0435
 http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0435

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arXiv