A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation
| dc.creator | Apt, Krzysztof R. | |
| dc.creator | Witzel, Andreas | |
| dc.date | 2007-09-04 | |
| dc.date | 2009-03-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-07-07T12:47:46Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-07-07T12:47:46Z | |
| dc.description | We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games. | |
| dc.description | 21 pages. To appear in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) | |
| dc.identifier | https://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0435 | |
| dc.identifier | http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0435 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://salesiana.dossiersoluciones.com/handle/123456789/221832 | |
| dc.subject | Computer Science and Game Theory | |
| dc.title | A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation | |
| dc.type | text |